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Not Without Justification
Christoph Kelp∗
Abstract
In this paper I take issue with Jonathan Sutton’s attempt at defend-
ing the thesis that knowledge is justified belief. I argue, first, that the
arguments he adduces in support of it fail. Second, I provide inde-
pendent reason to believe that knowledge and justified belief come
apart.
1 Introduction
In a number of recent pieces, Jonathan Sutton (2005, 2007) has de-
fended a novel approach to epistemology. The central thesis Sutton
aims to establish and that I will take issue with in this paper is:
The identity thesis. Justified belief is knowledge.
At first glance, the identity thesis is rather unattractive to say the
least. To begin with, it may be worth pointing out just how strong a
claim Sutton aims to establish here. The thought is not that simply
that there is a concept of justified belief that is coextensive with the
concept of knowledge. Rather, the thought is that any concept of
justified belief that is of core epistemological interest is coextensive
with that of knowledge. Here is Sutton:
I aim to show, first, that we do not and maybe cannot have a ser-
viceable notion of justification that is distinct from knowledge,
and, second, that we do not need one—we can get by better in
epistemology without one. (Sutton 2007, 2-3)
In light of the overall argument, it is no objection to my view
that some particular epistemological issue that I have perhaps
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not considered fully or at all might require a knowledge-independent
notion of justified belief, since the argument, I contend, estab-
lishes that there is no such notion to be had. (Sutton 2007, 40)
Notice, next, that the identity thesis also is highly revisionist: tradi-
tionally, justified belief is taken to be necessary but insufficient for
knowledge. What’s more, Sutton also intends to reverse the tradi-
tional direction of analysis: instead of defining the concept of knowl-
edge in terms of an independently understood concept of justified
belief, Sutton holds that the concept of justified belief is to be defined
in terms of an independently understood concept of knowledge.
Perhaps most importantly in relation to unattractiveness, how-
ever, is the fact that the identity thesis is intuitively highly implau-
sible. After all, consider the following, intuitively highly plausible
claims:
• Perceptual beliefs about dry, middle-sized goods that are in
plain view formed by normal adult human beings in good light-
ing conditions are justified. For instance, suppose A is driving
alongside a road in the countryside and sees a barn in the field
on the right. A’s belief that he is currently looking at a barn is
justified.
• Competent scientists beliefs in the best-confirmed scientific the-
ories at the time are justified. For instance, Priestly was justified
in believing that all flammable materials contain phlogiston.
• Some justified beliefs are false. For instance, suppose a spec of
dust on the printing plate of the newspaper I follow and know
to be highly reliable causes the print to look like ‘29’ instead of
‘28’. My false belief that the upcoming election will be on the
29th, say, is nonetheless justified.
The intuitive plausibility of these claims constitutes evidence for their
truth. If any one of these claims comes out true, then there must also
be a concept of justified belief that is not coextensive with the concept
of knowledge.1
1To see why the first claim supports the possibility of justified belief (in the
relevant sense) that falls short of knowledge, suppose that A is looking at the only
real barn in a field otherwise full of barn façades. The intuition that his belief
is justified remains unscathed. However, intuitively, his belief does not count as
knowledge—the case now is a run-of-the-mill Gettier case.
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Thus, the identity thesis is not only a very strong thesis, but it also
turns tradition on its head and is highly counterintuitive. As a result,
in aiming to defend it, Sutton shoulders a heavy burden of proof. In
the following section I will turn to Sutton’s attempt at discharging it.
2 Sutton’s arguments
Sutton adduces four arguments in support of the identity thesis.
He is very clear that one of these arguments—the “modesty argu-
ment”, which is intended to establish that one cannot justifiably be-
lieve propositions one knows one doesn’t know—by itself won’t es-
tablish the identity thesis. For that reason I will, for the purposes of
this paper at least, simply grant Sutton that it works in the way en-
visaged. As opposed to that, the other three arguments are intended
to directly and independently establish the identity thesis. In what
follows I will look at each of them and ask whether it does its job.
2.1 The assertion argument
Sutton’s first argument for the identity thesis proceeds along the fol-
lowing lines. Sutton agrees with Williamson and others that knowl-
edge is the norm of assertion. He then goes on to note:
One of the main goals of making assertions, if not the main
goal, is to transmit beliefs from one thinker to another. If the
beliefs so transmitted [are justified], it would be mysterious if
the assertions transmitting the beliefs failed to meet the stan-
dards governing good assertion. On the contrary, the assertions
in question have to meet the standards governing good asser-
tion impeccably since they transmit impeccable beliefs. It is not,
however, the knowledge rule that is at fault; the arguments of
Williamson and others for that rule are good ones. It is our
initial supposition that was at fault. There are no justified true
beliefs falling short of knowledge. (Sutton 2007, 46)
Here is my explication of Sutton’s argument:
AA1. The goal of assertion consists in the transmission of belief.
AA2. If the goal of assertion consists in the transmission of belief,
then any belief that satisfies the epistemic norm of belief also
satisfies the epistemic norm of assertion.2
2Sutton claims that any justified belief, if transmitted across assertion, satisfies
“the standards for good assertion”. This claim appears to be too strong. For in-
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AA3. Justification is the epistemic norm of belief.
AA4. Hence, any justified belief satisfies the epistemic norm of as-
sertion. [AA1 – AA3]
AA5. Knowledge is the epistemic norm of assertion.
AA6. Hence, any justified belief also qualifies as knowledge.3 [AA5,
AA6]
Should we be moved by the assertion argument? As I am about to ar-
gue, the answer here is “no”. To begin with, notice that at least some
of the premises at issue in the assertion argument are themselves sub-
stantive philosophical theses and as such hardly self-evident. As a re-
sult, while the assertion argument establishes that we cannot have all
of its premises and the negation of its conclusion, it is far from clear
that it is the negation of the conclusion that must go. On the contrary,
in view of the great prima facie implausibility of the conclusion, one
might initially be inclined to think that one of the premises must be
false. In order to get the assertion argument off the ground, Sutton
must provide convincing support for at least those premises that are
philosophically substantive. And this will have to include some good
argument that the relevant theses are preferable to at least the most
obvious alternatives on the philosophical market. However, as I will
show in due course, Sutton fails to deliver here. If my arguments are
successful, it follows that there is no reason to think that we must
buy the conclusion of the assertion argument rather than give up one
of its premises.
Let’s start with AA6, the knowledge norm of assertion. The ob-
vious alternative to AA6 is what Sutton calls the “J rule” according
to which justified belief is the epistemic norm of assertion. If the J
rule rather than the knowledge rule governs assertion, the assertion
stance, there may be politeness standards governing assertion that an assertion,
even one that transmits the relevant justified belief, may fail to satisfy. For that
reason I made the restriction to epistemic standards on behalf of Sutton here.
3It may be worth noting that, even if sound, the assertion argument in its present
form does not establish the identity thesis. After all, the identity thesis claims that
justified belief entails knowledge and that knowledge entails justified belief. Even
if successful, the assertion argument in its present form establishes only the first
entailment, i.e. the entailment from justified belief to knowledge. Notice, however,
that the other entailment, from knowledge to justified belief, is widely regarded as
uncontroversial among epistemologists. So, even if the assertion argument in its
present form does not establish the identity thesis, if successful, it does establish
the controversial half of the argument for the identity thesis.
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argument delivers the unexceptional result that any justified belief
is justified rather than the surprising result that any justified belief
must also qualify as knowledge. Thus, if the J rule rather than the
knowledge rule governs assertion, the assertion argument will not go
through.
In order to make the assertion argument cogent, Sutton needs to
provide reason to think that the J rule is not a viable alternative to the
knowledge rule. In order to achieve this, Sutton asks what the con-
cept of justified belief would have to look like in order to explain the
phenomena that, according to him, motivate the knowledge rule. He
distinguishes between two kinds of non-knowledgeable belief that
traditionalists about justified belief countenance: intuitively justified
beliefs that are known to fall short of knowledge (“known unknown
beliefs” as Sutton calls them) and intuitively justified beliefs that are
not known to fall short of knowledge (“unknown unknown beliefs”
as Sutton calls them). He then defines the concept of “U-justification”
as follows: A belief is U-justified if and only if either it is a known
belief or an unknown unknown belief. (Sutton 2007, 63) Now, Sut-
ton concedes to the traditionalist that if the concept of justification
at issue in the J rule is U-justification, then J rule explains the rele-
vant phenomena just as well as the knowledge rule does. However,
he also maintains that the knowledge rule retains an edge over the J
rule so understood:
The J rule is, in fact, more complex than the knowledge rule
. . . U-justification is more complex than knowledge since the
concept of U-justification is parasitic upon that of knowledge.
A U-justified belief is a belief that constitutes knowledge or a
belief that would have done so but for bad luck in the believer’s
external environment. At the very least, the burden of proof is
shifted back to the proponent of the J rule. He must show that
U-justification is in fact at least as primitive a concept as the
concept of knowledge rather than one that we understand as
a disjunction of knowledge and would-be knowledge.4 (Sutton
2007, 63)
4Sutton equates “unknown unknown beliefs” and “would-be knowledge”, i.e.
beliefs that would have qualified as knowledge “but for bad luck in the believer’s
external environment”. Notice also that Sutton takes his distinction between
“known unknown beliefs” and “unknown unknown beliefs” to partition the set
of beliefs that, according to the traditionalist, can be justified whilst not qualifying
as knowledge. Given that it does, however, the equation of “unknown unknown
beliefs” and “would-be knowledge” is false. To see this, suppose one does not
have sufficient evidence to come to know whether one’s evidence for P is strong
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I must confess that I don’t find Sutton’s argument very convincing. I
take it that no one in their right mind would deny that the concept of
U-justification is more complex than the concept of knowledge and
no one would attempt to show that it isn’t. At the same time, no
traditionalist I know has defined the concept of justification in the
way Sutton defines the concept of U-justification. Of course, Sutton
can define the concept of U-justification in whatever way he likes. He
can also use the concept so defined to specify what the traditionalists’
concept of justification would have to look like if it were to success-
fully explain certain phenomena. However, he cannot hope to rest an
argument against traditionalists on the observation that the concept
of U-justification that he defined and that no traditionalist holds is
more complex than the concept of knowledge. What he needs to do
instead is to show that there is no concept of justification that approx-
imates the extension of the concept of U-justification closely enough
to explain the phenomena. Moreover, Sutton cannot even shift the
burden of proof back on the shoulders of traditionalists in this way.
In order to shift the burden of proof to the traditionalist, he needs
to show at least that no existing traditionalist concept of justification
does the trick. However, he doesn’t do this.
What’s even worse, there is little hope that Sutton will be able
to fill the gap in his argument. To see this, notice first that Sutton
(2007, ch. 2.5.2) defines the concept of knowledge not reductively, i.e.
by giving a small set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions, but implicitly, i.e. through a set of platitudes, of common
sense beliefs about knowledge. Now, if Sutton is entitled to define the
concept of knowledge implicitly, then surely there is nothing wrong
with defining the concept of justified belief implicitly as well. Notice,
however, that we can now help ourselves to Sutton’s (2007, ch. 2.1.3)
“modesty argument”—which, recall, aims to show that there cannot
be any “known unknown beliefs”—to argue that the implicitly de-
fined concept of justified belief is coextensive with Sutton’s concept
enough to give one knowledge that P. Suppose, in fact, it isn’t. By the lights of the
traditionalist, one’s evidence may still be strong enough to justify belief in P. So,
suppose it does. If one believes P on the basis of this evidence, one has an “un-
known unknown belief” that isn’t “would-be knowledge”. After all, it is not bad
luck in the environment that prevents one from knowing but the quality of one’s
evidence. Arguably, some of Sutton’s arguments depend on both the partition of
traditionally justified belief and the equation of “unknown unknown beliefs” and
“would-be knowledge” and may therefore be problematic. However, I will not
pursue this line against Sutton here.
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of U-justification, in which case, by Sutton’s own lights, the J rule
will explain the relevant phenomena as well as the knowledge rule.
What these considerations show is that Sutton fails to provide
convincing reason to prefer the knowledge rule to the J rule and that,
given his further theoretical commitments and arguments, there is
reason to think that any attempt to do so is bound to fail. Hence, the
assertion argument, in Sutton’s mouth at least, is bound to fail. Yet,
one might wonder whether, independently of Sutton’s commitments
and arguments, there is sufficient reason to think that the knowledge
is rule is true. If there is, the assertion argument may still be success-
ful.
(Un)fortunately, there is reason for pessimism here as well. The
debate over the correct norm of assertion is ongoing. Apart from
the knowledge rule and the J rule, there are a number of further
competitors in the race. For instance, Kent Bach (2008) has argued
for a belief rule, Matthew Weiner (2005) for a truth rule and Jim
Stone (2007) for a context-sensitive rule of assertion. Defenders of
the various norms have not only given alternative explanations of
the phenomena that are to motivate the knowledge rule, but they
have also pointed to further phenomena which they claim favour
their account over the knowledge rule (see e.g. Lackey (2008), Weiner
(2005)) or have given further theoretical reason why their account
is preferable to the knowledge rule (see e.g. Douven (2006)). As a
result, the prospects for an argument from the knowledge rule to the
identity thesis are at present dim.
But perhaps the assertion argument is best understood as an ar-
gument that addresses sympathisers with the knowledge rule. In
other words, what the argument shows is that if one is tempted by
the knowledge rule, one must also buy the identity thesis. The asser-
tion argument does not even establish this much. As I am about to
argue, Sutton fails to make a convincing case not only for the knowl-
edge rule of assertion but also for the thesis that the goal of assertion
consists in the transmission of belief.
To begin with, recall that in order to get the assertion argument
off the ground, Sutton must at the very least show that the obvious
alternatives to the philosophically substantive premises are false. Re-
garding AA1, Sutton’s thesis that the goal of assertion consists in
the transmission of belief, the obvious alternative is that the goal of
assertion consists in the transmission of knowledge.
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Sutton considers this alternative but claims that it won’t block the
assertion argument. Here is how he puts the objection and how he
aims to respond to it:
It is not one of the goals of assertion to transmit belief; in light
of the knowledge rule, it is clearly to transmit knowledge. In-
deed, one might go further and claim that [a hearer, H] cannot
himself acquire a warranted belief from [a speaker, S] unless [S]
expresses knowledge. No warranted false belief can transmit its
warrant to another via testimony. If that is so, then the belief
that [H] acquires will be as defective as [S’s] assertion, and there
is harmony between the standards of belief and assertion.
These defenses do not remove our initial puzzle, however.
If a belief can be warranted despite being false, it is bizarre that
an assertion conveying such a belief is un- warranted. Why
do the main goals of assertion fail to encompass the conveying
of such beliefs? Why is an assertion not doing its job when it
conveys such a belief? It would add to our bafflement if [H]
could not acquire a warranted belief from [S’s] expression of a
warranted false belief. Why would assertion not act as a conduit
for warranted belief as well as knowledge proper? (Sutton 2007,
47)
Once again, Sutton’s argument here is unconvincing. To begin with,
if the goal of assertion consists in the transmission of knowledge, it
is not at all bizarre how assertions of justified beliefs that fall short
of knowledge can be unwarranted: such assertions do not only fail
to satisfy the epistemic norm of assertion, but they also do not and
cannot reach their goal. In this situation, it does not strike me as at
all bizarre that such assertions are unwarranted. On the contrary, it
would be bizarre if these assertions were warranted.
Relatedly, once the goal of assertion is understood in terms of
the transmission of knowledge, there is no longer reason to think
that there must be “harmony” between the standards of belief and
assertion. After all, Sutton’s thesis that the goal of assertion consists
in the transmission of belief motivated the thought that there should
be harmony here in the first place. Accordingly, there is no need
rescue this harmony by maintaining that justified false beliefs cannot
be transmitted to a hearer by an assertion of a justified false belief
and any bafflement that might result from making such a move can
be avoided. Sutton thus fails to provide convincing support for the
thesis that goal of assertion consists in the transmission of belief even
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vis-à-vis its most obvious competitor according to which it consists
in the transmission of knowledge. As a result the assertion argument
fails on this count as well.
2.2 The lottery argument
The lottery argument draws crucially on the so-called lottery para-
dox. The lottery paradox shows that the following three claims,
which are individually highly plausible, are jointly inconsistent:
The Lockean thesis. If it is very likely that P, then one has justification
to believe P.
The conjunction rule. If one has justification to believe P and one has
justification to believe Q, then one has justification to believe
both P and Q.
The contradiction thesis. One does not have justification to believe P
if one knows P to be a contradiction.5
Here is how Sutton ventures to argue from the lottery paradox to the
identity thesis:
[The lottery] argument builds on the work of Dana Nelkin (2000),
who presents two versions of the lottery paradox, one concern-
ing knowledge and the other justification, and argues that they
should receive a solution that locates the flaw in each paradox-
ical argument in the same place (in fact, counterpart premises)
. . . Nelkin’s uniform solution to the paradoxes involves deny-
ing that the belief that one’s ticket will not win is justified. I
will argue that Nelkin’s explanation of why it is unjustified is
incomplete at best. The best explanation, I will argue, is that
justification is knowledge. (Sutton 2007, 48)
Here is my explication of the argument:
5To see why these three claims are inconsistent, notice that no matter how high
we set the standards for satisfaction of the predicate “very likely”, there will be
some fair lottery with exactly one winner and sufficiently many tickets that it is
very likely that each ticket will lose. So suppose that a ticket will very likely lose
if the chances that it will lose are greater than 0.99999 and let l be a lottery one
knows to have 1000000 tickets and exactly one winner. By the Lockean thesis, for
each ticket in l, one has justification to believe that it will lose. By the conjunction
rule one has justification to believe that all tickets in l will lose and, since one
knows that there is exactly one winner, that exactly one ticket will win. By the
contradiction thesis, one does not have justification to believe this. Thus the three
claims are jointly inconsistent.
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LA1. There are two versions of the lottery paradox: one concerns
justification (henceforth also “the justification argument”), the
other knowledge (henceforth also “the knowledge argument”).6
LA2. The two versions of the paradox afford a uniform solution that
faults the Lockean thesis.
LA3. The identity thesis constitutes the best explanation why, in the
justification argument, the Lockean thesis fails.
LA4. Hence, the identity thesis holds. [LA1 – LA3]
In order to assess Sutton’s argument, let’s first take a closer look at
LA3, Sutton’s claim that the identity thesis provides the best expla-
nation of why the Lockean thesis for justification (henceforth also
“LJ”) fails. True, the identity thesis provides a very straightforward
explanation of the failure of LJ, to wit, that it is identical to the obvi-
ously false Lockean thesis for knowledge.7 In and of itself, that does
not mean that it is the best available explanation. In order to show
this, Sutton must show at least that his explanation of why LJ fails is
better than the alternatives that can be found in the literature. It is
somewhat surprising how little Sutton does here. He only discusses
one alternative solution to the paradox that denies the LJ, i.e. the one
given by Nelkin. However, the literature witnesses a wide range of
solutions of this type: Jonathan Adler (2002), Jake Chandler (2010),
Igor Douven (2002), Simon Evnine (1999), Keith Lehrer (e.g. 1990),
Mark Kaplan (e.g. 1996), John Pollock (e.g. 1990), Sharon Ryan (1996)
and Robert Stalnaker (1984) all provide solutions to the justification
version of paradox that deny LJ. Since Sutton provides no reason to
believe that his explanation of why LJ fails is better than these alter-
native explanations, he fails to provide sufficient support for LA3.
Let’s now focus on LA2, Sutton’s claim that the two versions of
the paradox afford a uniform solution that faults the Lockean thesis.
Why think that the two versions of the paradox afford a uniform
solution? Sutton tells us that “it is a clear desideratum of a solution
6The knowledge argument can be obtained from the above justification argu-
ment by replacing “has justification to believe” by “is in a position to know” and
adding the clause that P be true to the antecedent of the conditional in the Lockean
thesis.
7Consider: While it is intuitively plausible that you have justification to believe
that some ticket will lose a lottery it is very likely to lose, it is clear that you aren’t
in a position to know that it will lose such a lottery. As a result, the Lockean thesis
for knowledge must be false.
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to one version that it can be applied to the other.” (Sutton 2007, 50)
However, upon reflection, it is not so clear that this is in fact so. To
see why not, notice, as Sutton himself acknowledges, that, unlike
the justification argument, the knowledge argument “is not really a
paradox at all.” (Sutton 2007, 50) After all, a moment’s reflection
reveals that the Lockean thesis for knowledge does not hold.
Given that the knowledge argument isn’t really a paradox, how-
ever, it is far from clear that a uniform solution to the two arguments
is indeed desirable. To see this, consider first the closure paradox,
which shows that the following three individually highly plausible
claims are inconsistent:
SK1. I know that I am in Manhattan.
SK2. Knowledge is closed under known logical entailment: If one
knows that P entails Q, then, if one knows that P, then one
knows that Q. Since I know that my being in Manhattan entails
that I am not a brain in a vat on Alpha Centauri: If I know that
I am in Manhattan, I know that I am not a brain in a vat on
Alpha Centauri.
SK3. I don’t know that I am not a brain in a vat on Alpha Centauri.
In the spirit of Sutton and Nelkin, let’s distinguish two versions
of the closure paradox, one concerning knowledge (henceforth also
“the closure argument”), the other concerning strangeness (hence-
forth also “the strangeness argument”). Here is the strangeness ar-
gument:
ST1. It is strange that I am in Manhattan.
ST2. Strangeness is closed under known logical entailment: If one
knows that P entails Q, then, if it is strange that P, then it is
strange that Q. Since I know that my being in Manhattan entails
that I am not a brain in a vat on Alpha Centauri: If it is strange
that I am in Manhattan, it is strange that I am not a brain in a
vat on Alpha Centauri.
ST3. It is not strange that I am not a brain in a vat on Alpha Cen-
tauri.
Unlike the closure argument, the strangeness argument is not really
a paradox: a moment’s reflection makes it obvious that strangeness
11
is not closed under known logical entailment. At the same time, any
temptation to think that it is nonetheless desirable to give a uniform
solution to the two arguments is surely misguided. No one in their
right mind would claim that since the culprit in the strangeness argu-
ment is the closure principle, it is desirable to say that, in the closure
argument, it is also the closure principle that is at fault. It thus be-
comes clear that, where there are two superficially similar arguments
one of which is a paradox, whilst the other one isn’t, there is no need
to give a uniform solution to them.8
It turns out that, once again, Sutton fails to provide convincing
support for two crucial premises of the argument. He fails to estab-
lish that the identity thesis does indeed provide the best explanation
of why LJ fails. What’s even worse, however, we have seen that there
is excellent reason to believe that the uniformity desideratum, on
which the argument crucially rests, is false. As a result, the lottery
argument fares no better than the assertion argument.
2.3 The posterior evaluation argument
The last argument that Sutton adduces in support of the identity
thesis takes the following shape:
If a belief that P is one that would be justified were one to form
it, and it is in one’s interest to have a belief in whether or not
P, and one is capable of forming such a belief, then, in some in-
tuitive sense, one should believe that P . . . This claim is clearly
true if we read ‘would be justified’ as ‘would constitute knowl-
edge’. I will argue that it is not true on any more expansive
conception of [justification]. (Sutton 2007, 57)
Once again, here is my explication of the argument:
PE1. If one has an interest in whether P and one is capable of form-
ing a justified belief that P, then there is some intuitive sense in
which one ought to form a belief that P.
PE2. There is no intuitive sense in which one ought to form non-
knowledgeable but (allegedly) justified beliefs that one has an
interest in and is capable of forming.
8It is plausible that the uniformity desideratum holds where two arguments are
indeed two manifestations of the same paradox. Notice that it is also possible that
two arguments are both manifestations of paradoxes and appear to be manifesta-
tions of the same paradox but in fact aren’t. In that case, there is no need to provide
a uniform solution to them either.
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PE3. Hence, there aren’t any non-knowledgeable justified beliefs.
[PE1, PE2]
Let’s grant Sutton that PE1 is indeed true. What about PE2? Here is
how Sutton ventures to mount a case for it. He asks us to consider
the following two cases:
Case 1. At ti, one has an interest in the question whether one has
a colleague who owns a Ford. One also has the opportunity to
acquire a belief that one has a colleague who owns a Ford (call
this proposition “FORD”): one has excellent evidence in favour
of FORD. One’s colleague A has shown one papers of a Ford
in his name, a video tape that shows him winning a Ford in a
well-known TV show, a number of highly trustworthy people
have testified that he owns a Ford, he arrives at work in a Ford
etc. What’s more, at ti, one has no reason to distrust any of this
evidence.
Crucially, (a) one does not form a belief in FORD and (b) one
is not in a position to come to know FORD because one’s belief
would have been gettierised: the evidence produced by A is
misleading, while, at the same time, another colleague, B, owns
a Ford.
Case 2. At ti, one has an interest in the question whether one has
a colleague who owns a Ford. One also has the opportunity to
acquire a belief in FORD: one has excellent evidence in favour
of FORD. One’s colleague A has shown one papers of a Ford
in his name, a video tape that shows him winning a Ford in a
well-known TV show, a number of highly trustworthy people
have testified that he owns a Ford, he arrives at work in a Ford
etc. What’s more, at ti, one has no reason to distrust any of this
evidence.
Crucially, (a) one does not form a belief in FORD and (b) one is
in a position to know FORD.
Next, Sutton invites us to suppose that, at some later time, tj, one has
come to know all the relevant facts about one’s epistemic position at
ti and asks how one would, intuitively, evaluate one’s situation at ti
with respect to FORD. He makes the following suggestion:
There is an intuitive (but nonepistemic) sense in which [one]
should have formed the belief [in FORD] because it would have
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been true [this is what happens in Case 1], and in a different
case [that is, in Case 2] there is a different intuitive sense (one
partially epistemic) in which one should have formed that belief
because it would have constituted knowledge. What we lack, I
claim, is the intermediate case. When one could have formed an
allegedly justified, true belief [in FORD], but one failed to do
so, there is no intuitive sense in which one should have done so
beyond the nonepistemic sense in which one should have done
so because it would have been true. (Sutton 2007, 50)
Sutton thus agrees that in both cases there is an intuition that one
should have formed the belief one could have formed. Crucially,
however, Sutton claims that in Case 1 this intuition is grounded in
the fact that one could have formed a true belief rather than in the
fact that one could have formed a justified one. If this is correct, then
it looks as though there is evidence for PE2.
Now the problem is that in Case 1, the belief one could have
formed would not only have been true but also justified. So, cru-
cially, Sutton needs to back up his claim that it is the fact that one’s
belief would have been true rather than that it would have been jus-
tified that grounds the relevant intuition in Case 1. Sutton ventures
to achieve this by arguing that the intuition that one should have
formed a belief survives if we alter the case so that the proposition
remains true but one has “no evidence whatsoever” for FORD. Here
is Sutton:
However, we can say exactly the same about a similar situation
in which one has no evidence whatsoever [in favour of FORD],
although in fact one has such a col- league. There is an intuitive
sense in which one should have formed the belief [in FORD]
despite the fact that such a belief would have been unjustified
by anyone’s lights. Such a belief would have been true. (Sutton
2007, 58)
Somewhat surprisingly (or perhaps not so surprisingly), Sutton rests
content with making this statement in abstracto, i.e. without actually
describing the relevant situation. So let’s fill in the details for him:
Case 3. At ti, one is interested in the question whether one has a
colleague who owns a Ford, but one has no evidence whatso-
ever bearing on this question. One does have the opportunity
to acquire a belief in FORD: a famous hypnotist offers to instil
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it in one (or, alternatively, perhaps one almost forms the belief
on the basis of wishful thinking).
Crucially, (a) one does not form a belief in FORD, while (b)
one’s belief in FORD would have been true.
Even knowing that FORD is in fact true, I simply do not have the
intuition that, at ti, I ought to have accepted the hypnotist’s offer
(or ought to have formed the belief on the basis of wishful thinking)
because that would have given me a true belief in FORD. What,
intuitively, I should have done instead is suspend judgement on the
question. Moreover, I am also fairly optimistic that I am not the only
traditionalist with these intuitions. As a result, Sutton’s argument
that, in Case 1, the intuition that one ought to have formed a belief
in FORD is grounded in the truth of FORD rather than in the fact
that one could have justifiably believed it fails at least in the sense
that it begs the question against those traditionalist who share my
intuitions about Case 3.9
Another problem with Sutton’s argument is that, even if we sup-
pose that Sutton’s intuitions here are unobjectionable, the argument
simply does not establish that, in Case 1, there is no intuitive sense
in which one ought to have believed P because one’s belief would
have been justified. If successful, the argument provides reason to
think that there is an intuitive sense in which, at ti, one should have
believed P because it was true. It is consistent with this, however,
that there is a different intuitive sense in which, at ti, one should have
believed that P because one’s belief would have been justified. For
the argument to go through, Sutton needs to argue, additionally, that
there is no such intuitive sense. However, once again, Sutton does
not do this.10
So, let’s ask whether there is an intuitive sense in which that one
should have formed a belief in FORD because it would have been
justified. Following Sutton, I suggest that we answer this question
by determining whether the intuition survives if we alter the case so
9It seems as though Sutton himself is aware that the intuitions that are to sup-
port his argument are not the most solid when he makes the following concession:
“[T]he posterior evaluation argument . . . is arguably the least intuitively compelling
of my arguments.” (Sutton 2007, 60)
10Notice that Sutton’s claim that there is an intuition that, in Case 3, one ought
to form the belief in FORD won’t help him here. After all, one’s belief is, as Sutton
also acknowledges, not justified. Hence, Case 3 is unsuited to show whether or not
there is a sense in which one ought to form some belief because it is justified.
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that one’s evidence remains the same, while the target proposition is
false. Consider:
Case 4. At ti, one has an interest in the question whether one has
a colleague who owns a Ford. One also has the opportunity
to acquire a belief that one has a colleague who owns a Ford:
one has excellent evidence in favour of FORD. Colleague A
has shown one papers of a Ford in his name, a video tape that
shows him winning a Ford in a well-known TV show, a number
of highly trustworthy people have testified that he owns a Ford,
he arrives at work in a Ford etc. What’s more, at ti, one has no
reason to distrust any of this evidence.
Crucially, (a) one does not form a belief in FORD, and (b) one’s
belief in FORD would have been false: the evidence produced
by A was misleading and no other colleague owns a Ford.
Is there an intuitive sense in which, at ti, I should have formed a be-
lief in FORD? It seems to me overwhelmingly plausible that there
is: it was highly irrational of me not to when I had such excellent
evidence in favour of FORD. Does this change if I evaluate the situa-
tion at a later time at which I have become aware of the fact that the
apparently excellent evidence was in fact misleading? Not at all: it
remains plausible that it was highly irrational of me not to form the
belief and that, therefore, in a sense I should have formed it. If this is
correct, PE2, is false.
It becomes clear that the posterior evaluation argument is bound
to fail: The way in which Sutton ventures to defend PE2 begs the
question against some traditionalists and, what’s worse, there is rea-
son to think that PE2 is in fact false. That means, however, that Sut-
ton’s last argument for the identity thesis also fails.
3 Why justified belief isn’t knowledge
It becomes clear that Sutton fails to make a convincing case for the
identity thesis. Even so, however, so far we have only seen that Sut-
ton’s case for the identity thesis is unconvincing. For all that I have
shown so far, there is a case for the identity thesis out there. For that
reason in this section I will provide some perfectly general reason to
believe that the identity thesis is false: there is a concept of justified
belief that is independent of the concept of knowledge in the sense
that it is not coextensive with the concept of knowledge. In order to
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achieve this, I will first argue that there are some distinctions that it
makes sense for us to make but that we could not make unless we
had an independent concept of justified belief.
There are propositions, even true ones, that, in certain cases at
least, cognitive agents like us are not in a position to know. For sim-
plicity’s sake I will here focus on a case in which the target propo-
sition is false. Let A be an agent who, in familiar circumstances,
has the ability to perceptually identify sheep from a wide variety of
viewpoints. Presently, A sees what looks like a sheep to him next to
an alpine hut and forms a corresponding belief. Unbeknownst to A,
however, there is a sheep-themed party going on inside the hut and
the animal A sees is actually a dog in fancy dress. Now contrast A
with another agent, B, who comes by a belief with the same content
on the basis of ‘evidence’ provided by crystal balls, tea leaves and the
like. Surely, in our epistemic assessment of the two beliefs, it makes
sense to mark the distinction between A and B’s beliefs.11 A concept
of justified belief with application conditions distinct from those gov-
11For those who, unlike me, do not find it immediately obvious that it makes
sense to mark this distinction, here is a sketch of an argument in support of this
claim (inspired by Sosa). Sosa (2007, 22-3) argues that all performances that have
an aim are assessable in terms of accuracy (reaching the aim), adroitness (mani-
festing competence), and aptness (accuracy through adroitness). In the above case,
aptness of cognitive performance is out of the question. Still, A’s cognitive per-
formance differs from B’s in that A’s performance is adroit, whilst B’s isn’t. After
all, A manifests a disposition that, in normal circumstances at least, would en-
sure/make highly likely that the belief he forms is true (qualifies as knowledge).
As a result, A’s disposition qualifies as a competence (see Sosa 2007, 29). (Notice
also that it does so no matter whether the cognitive aim is construed standardly as
true belief or in the way envisaged by Sutton as knowledge.) As opposed to that,
the disposition B manifests is not such as to ensure or even make highly likely
that, in normal circumstances, B’s belief is true (qualifies as knowledge). As a re-
sult, B’s disposition does not qualify as a competence (again, no matter whether
we construe the cognitive aim in the standard way or as envisaged by Sutton). To
the extent that it makes sense to distinguish between accuracy, adroitness and apt-
ness of performances, it makes sense to distinguish, in our epistemic assessments,
between A and B’s beliefs.
One might worry that we still haven’t answered the question concerning the
reasonableness of distinguishing between A and B’s beliefs to any degree of satis-
faction lest we have elucidated why it makes sense distinguish between accuracy,
adroitness and aptness of performances. Providing a fully satisfactory answer to
this question seems too tall an order for the purposes of this paper. One obvious
reason for making these distinctions, however, is that they facilitate improvements
in future performances. Once we have figured out in what way a performance was
wanting, we can assess what needs to be done to ensure reaching the aim in the
future and take appropriate steps.
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erning the concept of knowledge allows us to make this distinction.
One might object that this does not demonstrate the need for a
distinct concept of justified belief. The distinction between A and B
can be explained in terms of the concept of blameless belief. Accord-
ing to this suggestion, then, whilst neither A nor B are justified in
their beliefs, A’s belief is blameless in a way in which B’s belief isn’t.
However, this move won’t do the trick here. To see why not, consider
a case in which someone, C, is hypnotised to form beliefs about the
presence of sheep in response to certain cues (that are entirely unre-
lated to the presence of sheep). When such a cue is presented and
C forms the corresponding belief, C is surely blameless in believing
as he does. Yet, it makes as much sense to distinguish in our epis-
temic assessments between the beliefs of A and C as it makes sense
to distinguish between the beliefs of A and B.12 That is to say, even
when knowledge is not attainable, it still makes sense to distinguish
in our epistemic assessments between good belief, blameless belief
and blameworthy belief. A concept of justified belief with applica-
tion conditions distinct from those governing the concept of knowl-
edge plays a part in allowing us to make just these distinctions.
But perhaps even this is not enough to show that it makes sense
for us to have a distinct concept of justified belief. Following Sutton
once more, one could maintain that the distinctions can be explained
in terms of what the agent knows to be probable. More specifically,
the thought is that, while neither A nor C knows, unqualifiedly, that
there is a sheep next to the hut, A but not C knows this to be likely.
It seems to me that there is little mileage in this move. To begin with,
it may be that C also knows that it is likely that there is a sheep
next to the hut. Suppose, for instance, that C has just been told by
a knowledgeable source that there will be exactly one animal next
to the hut and that it will likely be sheep. If so, he can still know
that it’s likely that there is a sheep next to the hut he is walking
past even though his unqualified belief about the presence of a sheep
does not qualify as knowledge since it is false. On the other hand,
A may also fail to know that it is likely there is a sheep next to the
hut. To see this, suppose that A does not even have the concept of
probability. Since A does not have this concept, he is in no position
to acquire beliefs about what is probable. So, when, in the present
case, A forms a belief about the presence of a sheep, he not only fails
to know, unqualifiedly, that there is a sheep next to the hut, but also
12Again, A’s but not C’s belief is adroit.
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fails to know that, likely, there is a sheep next to the hut. Still, it
makes sense to distinguish in our epistemic assessments between the
unqualified beliefs of A and C. The distinction cannot be recovered in
terms of a distinction in knowledge of probability. A distinct concept
of justified belief plays a part in allowing us to make this distinction.
If this is correct, of course, the identity thesis can only be expected to
fail.∗
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